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PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO
OTHER THAN SUBVERSIVE MA1TERS
Hutcheson v. United States
369 U.S. 599 (1962)
Petitioner, president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, was subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field
(the McClellan Committee). He was called primarily to answer ques-
tions concerning the use of union funds in publishing a biography of his
father. The inquiry extended, however, to questions concerning the use
of union funds to bribe a grand jury in Indiana, a crime for which he was
then under indictment in that state.' He refused to answer approximately
eighteen questions concerning this matter. Although the committee would
have permitted petitioner to use his privilege against self-incrimination, 2
he did not wish to do so, for under Indiana law the exercise of this privi-
lege could itself be used against him in the pending state proceedings 3
Had he answered the questions, his testimony could have been used against
him in the same state proceedings.4 He refused to answer on the ground
that the coerced election of either alternative deprived him of due process.
1 He was convicted more than two years later; the case is now before the Su-
preme Court of Indiana, (according to the Supreme Court, I could find no citation).
2 Hutcheson v. U.S., 369 U.S. 599, 605 n. 10 (1962). The committee need not
have been so generous; U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), and Hale v. Henkel
201 U.S. 43 (1906) hold that possible self-incrimination under state law is not a
ground for refusing to answer questions in a federal inquiry.
3 Crickmore v. State, 213 Ind. 186, 12 N.E. 2d 226 (1938). Under Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
this would not violate any due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. A
further reason for not invoking the privilege may have been a desire not to violate
the AFL-CIO Code of Ethics, Hutcheson v. U.S. supra, at 609-10, n.14 (1962).
4 Although an old statute immunizing witnesses before congressional committees
would have prohibited state use of such testimony, 18 U.S.C. §3486, 62 Stat. 833
(1948), Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 178 (1954), (the section "extends protection
to all witnesses, to all testimony, and in all courts." at 184), that section was amended,
68 Stat. 745 (1954) immunizing only the testimony of witnesses in subversive investi-
gations. U.S. v. Baker, 293 F. 2d 613 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914
(1962).
5 11 Stat. 155 (1857), 2 U.S.C. §192 (1952) provides:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either
House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter
under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of the two Houses Of Congress, or any committee or
either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared,
refuses to answer any question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
138
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
For his recalcitrance he was convicted of contempt under 2 U.S.C. 6, §192, 5
sentenced to six months imprisonment, and fined $500.6 The court of
appeals affirmed without opinion.7 The Supreme Court also affirmed, in
an opinion written by Mr. Justice Harlan and joined in by Justices Clark
and Stewart.
Petitioner argued two propositions: (1) that the committee should
not have asked these questions because they were not pertinent to any
properly authorized legislative subject and served merely to expose him
to public ridicule; (2) that the coerced election of answering or of invok-
ing the fifth amendment deprived him of due process. The majority found
against petitioner on the first issue, and felt that the due process claims
were not properly raised or ripe for adjudication. The concurring opinion
agreed, but indicated approval of a different result on the second issue
in a proper case. The dissenters felt that petitioner's dilemma negatived
whatever valid purpose was to be served by the Committee's questions,
and that the obstacles presented to petitioner by the Court's previous de-
cisions regarding the privilege against self-incrimination should be removed.
The first issue turned on a long line of cases where witnesses
have questioned the conduct and procedure of congressional committees.
Through the years the Court has fashioned a framework which Congress
must observe in conducting investigations. The inherent power of Con-
gress to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its delegated powers was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Dunn.8 In 18819 the
Court limited the broad scope of the power by asserting that it was the
function of the judiciary, not the legislature, to determine whether the
questions asked by a congressional committee were within Congress' con-
stitutional powers of inquiry. The Court later added a second require-
ment that the investigation itself must be held for a legitimate legislative
objective.10
In 1929, the Court set forth a third requirement, that the particular
questions asked a witness must themselves be pertinent to the matter under
demeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month and not more than
twelve months.
6 Unreported.
7 285 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
8 19 U.S. 204 (1821). In the same case the Court sanctioned the power to in-
carcerate a recalcitrant witness for contempt. Congress apparently still has this
power, although it has not exercised the power in recent years. Witnesses are now
punished in federal court under 2 U.S.C. §192 supra note 4. This section was upheld
in In Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897), as not being unconstitutionally vague. The
phrase "any matter under inquiry" was deemed to refer to matters within the juris-
diction of Congress and questions pertinent thereto.
9 Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
10 McGrain v. Daugherty, 173 U. S. 135 (1927). In Kilbourne, the questioning
was improper, serving only to expose the witness, against whom a civil suit was
pending. In McGrain the inquiry into certain acts of misfeasance on the part of the
Attorney General, petitioner's brother, was held proper
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inquiry."1 Questions may be pertinent, however, even if the information
sought might also be of use in a criminal action pending against the wit-
ness.' 2  Pertinency, as well as legitimacy of the legislative objective are
subject to judicial review.
Recent decisions involving Congressional investigations into Com-
munist activities have stressed that courts will not aid Congress in pun-
ishing contempt unless Congress complies with due process requirements:
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be honored
in investigations into Communist activities ;13 the scope of a ruling on per-
tinency must be "brought home" to the witness at the time he objects ;14
the ruling on pertinency must be adequate;15 the grand jury indictment
must indicate the bases of the pertinency of the question ;16 and the prose-
cutor must prove that as a matter of law the questions were in fact per-
tinent.'7
A recent case involving a state investigation of subversive activity and
the NAACP may add two more limitations on the power of legislative
investigations.' 8 When a committee is investigating communist infiltra-
tion into an otherwise legitimate organization, a substantial relationship
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling
state interest must be shown in advance by clear and convincing evidence.' 9
It remains to be seen whether these requirements will be applied equally
"1 Sinclair v. U.S. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
12 The Court argued that a question whose answer may tend to incriminate the
witness, may nonetheless be pertinent. On the other hand, one could argue, as does
Chief Justice Warren, that an inquiry into matters pending before a state court is
impertinent and out of bounds.
'3 Quinn v. U.S., 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; Empsak v. U.S. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
The privilege can be used when questions are asked about communist activities, but
not according to the Hale and Murdock decisions, supra note 2, and perhaps Sinclair,
supra note 11, when questions are asked relative only to possible prosecutions in state
courts.
14 Bart v. U.S., 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
15 Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Petitioner testified freely as to his own
communist activities, but refused to give information concerning his past associates
on the ground that the questions were not pertinent. The Supreme Court in agreeing
with petitioner rejected committee findings that the questions were pertinent to the
matter under inquiry. The apparently tough stand taken in this case, and implications
that the House Committee on Unamerican Activities enabling resolution was un-
constitutionally vague, were discarded in Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
16 Russell v. U.S., 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
17 Deutch v. U.S., 367 456 (1961). Two other cases decided the same year,
Braden v. U.S. 365 U.S. 431 (1961), and Wilkinson v. U.S., 365 U.S. 399 (1961),
followed Barenblatt, supra note 15.
18 Gibson v. Florida Investigating Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
19 By such a requirement, as the dissent points out, the committee may have to
prove in advance the very things it is trying to find out. The witness could then re-
fuse to answer the question because of its redundancy.
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to congressional investigations or to investigations of organizations other
than the NAACP.
20
Excerpts of the hearings published in this case adequately support
the Court's decision against petitioner's first argument. The subcommittee
was investigating the activities of union officials to determine whether ad-
ditional legislation was needed to protect union funds from abuse.21 Ques-
tions which could determine whether a ranking union official had misap-
propriated funds to bribe a grand jury were clearly relevant to determine
whether Congress should require officials to report disbursements of union
funds. The witness was made fully aware of the subcommittee's purpose
and of the pertinency of its questions, and he was unable to demonstrate
that the committee lacked good faith, i.e., that it was in fact asking the
questions only to expose him to public obloquy or to prejudice his trial
then pending before a state court.
2 2
On the other hand, the Supreme Court was under a compelling obliga-
tion to guarantee that petitioner's pending trial in Indiana would not be
prejudiced unnecessarily by congressional action. In balancing the com-
peting interests, it may be that undue emphasis was given to the fact-
gathering needs of Congress under the circumstances. Much of the infor-
mation which the committee sought was doubtless available from other
sources, (Indiana convicted petitioner on just such information). The
testimony of petitioner might have been postponed until after the criminal
trial without substantial prejudice to Congress, since the problem under
investigation was of a continuing nature and did not specially demand
emergency legislation. To a certain extent, the information petitioner
possessed was probably merely cumulative as is evidenced by the fact that
subsequent federal legislation was enacted without the benefit of his co-
operation. Moreover, the harm which could result to petitioner from his
congressional testimony being used against him in the state trial, or from
the jury's awareness that he had taken shelter in the fifth amendment,
was substantial. The case consequently does pit procedural due process
needs against the legitimate investigatory needs of Congress, and did
20 Cf. NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 884 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) for an indication that the Court protects the NAACP in areas where it
would normally decline to interfere.
21 Numerous abuses were found, and the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 was enacted. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 401 (1962).
22 Petitioner had claimed in Watkins, supra note 15, intcr alia, that the committee
was trying to expose him for exposure's sake alone. While the Court agreed that
Congress could not do this, the Court, and in particular Mr. Justice Frankfurter con-
curring, declined to look behind the logical relevance of the question, found wanting
in that case, to determine pertinency. The Court adhered to this view in Barenblatt,
supra note 15, Braden and Wilkinson, supra note 17, while Mr. Justice Black in his
dissenting opinions pointed out that the primary purpose of the committee in asking
its questions was for exposure. The Court's view he felt, meant that "the committee
may engage in any enquiry a majority of the Court happens to think could possibly
be for a legitimate purpose, whether that "purpose" be the true reason for the inquiry
or not." Wilkinson, supra note 17 at 420.
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provide an appropriate occasion for the Court to reconsider a proper ac-
commodation between them. Necessarily, any such consideration would
have involved a review of the scope of the fifth amendment, the significance
of the privilege against self-incrimination under the fourteenth amendment,
and the scope of federal and state immunity statutes.
The present condition of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, as applied to collateral state criminal trials, represents a
long and checkered history. In a very early decision, Chief Justice Mar-
shall indicated that a witness in a federal court could claim the privilege
when the only danger of incrimination was under state law 23 Similarly,
a case involving the federal immunity statute 24 implied that the immunity
granted under federal law would extend to state prosecutions, but avoided
saying that the privilege could be used when the only danger of incrim-
ination was under state law.235 It noted merely that such a danger was too
remote on the facts of the case at hand. A later case26 denied the use of the
privilege in a state court where the only danger of incrimination was under
federal law. It added as a dictum, however, that immunity would be only
coextensive with the particular jurisdiction in question. Hale v. Hankel2T
and U.S. v. Murdock28 crystallized this dictum; relying on two English
cases, the Court denied the use of the privilege when the only danger of
incrimination was under the law of another sovereign.29 These last two
cases were given a firmer constitutional footing after Twining v. New
Jersey30, where the Court clearly indicated that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not come under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; thus a denial of the privilege in state or federal court for
incrimination in another is not a denial of due process.
At the hearing petitioner based his refusal on the fifth amendment
due process clause, rather than on his privilege. Had he been denied
the use of the privilege, the validity of the Hale and Murdock decisions
would have been called into question. Had its use been permitted the valid-
ity of Twining and Adamson v. California3 could have been put in issue.
Because of his express disclaimer, the Court felt that the due process claim
could not serve to raise the applicability of the privilege, although, re-
23 U.S. v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. 100 (1828). The Court in the instant case feels
this to be merely a rule of equity and not a constitutional requirement, Hutcheson v.
U.S., at 608, n. 13.
24 27 Stat. 443 (1893).
25 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
26 Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 272 (1904).
27 Supra note 2.
28 Supra note 2.
29 Queen be Boyes, 1 B&S 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861). King of the Two
Sicilies v. Wilcox, 1 Sim (N.S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851). A later English
case, U.S.A. v. McRae (1867) L.R. 3 Ch 19, permitted the exercise of the privilege,
indicating that the test is one of remoteness as used in Brown v. Walker, supra note
25.
30 Supra note 3.
31 Supra note 3.
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liance on one clause does not ordinarily preclude reliance on the other 32
He also argued that the possible use of his privilege in the state trial was
a denial of due process, but the Court felt that it could not determine that
issue other than on appeal of his state conviction. Similarly, his con-
tention that due process had been denied him in that the hearings were a
pre-trial of his state conviction, was also dismissed on the ground that it
was not ripe for adjudication.
Despite the technical soundness of each of these rulings, taken as a
whole they result in petitioner's being sent to federal prison for contempt,
a fate which he might have been spared had he answered or relied on his
privilege. It is fundamentally unfair to imprison petitioner because he
sought to avoid the penalties attached to either of these two courses of
action, penalties imposed by this Court. In this manner he does question
prior decisions concerning the privilege, because they created the bind
which denied him due process. The Court should have examined the
possibilities of overruling these decisions.
Mr. Justice Douglas has long advocated the overruling of Adamson,
which would result in the inclusion of the privilege in the fourteenth
amendment.33 In the instant case, this would mean that if petitioner chose
to rely on his privilege in the committee hearing, due process would re-
quire that this fact not be commented upon later at the state trial. This
solution, however, does not answer the basic federal question presented by
the Hale and Murdock decisions, namely that under the dual sovereignty
theory, the privilege just does not extend beyond protection against the
sovereign immediately involved.
To relieve petitioner of his dilemma completely, not only must the
privilege be brought within the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, but the Hale and Murdock decisions must also be overruled. Such
a result would not be particularly startling in light of the new composition
of the Court, and the dicta in Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in the instant case that these cases should be overruled.34
One basis of such a decision would be to follow Mr. Justice Brennan's
reasoning that since the first and fourth amendments are incorporated into
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, there is no longer
any logical or historical basis for discrimination against the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 35 In other words, he feels that
the privilege is just as essential to concepts of fundamental fairness and
ordered liberty as rights guaranteed under those two amendments. If it
is a basic idea in our society that one should not have to participate in one's
own conviction, then the difference between a coerced confession and a
32 U.S. v. Baranblatt, supra note 15 at 112.
33 Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952), and Hutcheson v. U.S.,
supra note 2 at 641. The Court seems to have recently drawn on self-incrimination to
extend search and seizure and involuntary confession evidence, Wong Sun v. U.S.,
83 S.Ct.407 (1963).
34 Hutcheson v. U.S. supra note 2.
35 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 159 (1961).
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stomach pump on the one hand, and incrimination by court room utterances
on the other, is merely one of degree and not a difference in kind.
Another approach would be to pursue Mr. Justice Black's argument in
Mapp v. Ohio,36 viz, that the basis for extending the exclusionary rule of
the fourth amendment to the states should be that the admission of such
evidence is self-incriminating under the fifth amendment.3 7 If the privilege
is then considered to be implicit in the concepts of fundamental fairness
and ordered liberty in the context of search and seizure, it would follow
that to protect this right, its use could not be commented upon when used
in a legislative investigation. Furthermore, due process would require
that the use of the privilege be permitted in federal forums when the
tendency to incriminate would be under state law and vice versa.
If this be done, problems would arise as to the extension of federal
and state immunity statutes. While Congress could extend immunity to
state prosecutions 3 as a necessary and proper exercise of its enumerated
powers, there is no constitutional basis for a state to protect witnesses
from prosecution in other state or federal courts by means of an immunity
statute. Indeed, constitutional questions would be raised if immunity
were extended by states into areas in which Congress had chosen to act.
Even if it could be so extended, the results might be undesirable because
the tendency for abuse, particularly by Southern States, would be great.39
However, just as was done before Mapp v. Ohio, federal courts could ex-
clude testimony obtained at state interrogations under their supervisory
powers, to prevent the abuse of the "silver platter" doctrine.4 0
If these steps were taken, petitioner in the instant case could have
asserted his privilege, without fear that this fact would be commented
upon later. Or conversely, if immunity had been granted, he could have
been free to testify, and this evidence would not have been available to the
prosecution in the pending state trial. This result would mitigate some
of the harshness arising from our federal system: if only one jurisdiction
had been involved, petitioner would not have been faced with this dilemma.
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37 This idea was first given expression by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. U.S.,
116 U.S. 616 (1881), and has been used by Justices Black and Douglas in their dis-
senting opinions. Cf. Ullman v. U.S., 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Douglas does not dis-
tinguish in and out of court incrimination. It could be argued that the latter method
of incrimination presents a greater opportunity for abuse and hence is entitled to
greater protection than the former.
38 As it has done before with congressional investigations, see note 4 supra.
39 For example, in cases involving racial violence, a white person acquitted or
sentenced slightly, would then be immune from federal prosecution.
40 Under this doctrine, evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure by a
federal officer, though excluded from federal courts could be handed over on a "silver
platter" to state officials and vice versa. Lustig v. U.S. 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1948), over-
ruled in Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Here a state could, through the use of
its own immunity statutes gain testimony and other evidence which it could then turn
over to federal officials for federal prosecution. Federal courts could simply exclude
testimony so obtained, although they would not be constitutionally required to do so.
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